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This thesis introduces a new approach to enhance the reliability of conventional passive anti-
islanding protection scheme in distribution systems embedding distributed generation. This 
approach uses an Islanding-Dedicated System (IDS) per phase which will be logically 
combined with the conventional scheme, either in blocking or permissive modes. Each phase 
IDS is designed based on data mining techniques. The use of Artificial Neural Networks 
(ANNs) enables to reach higher accuracy and speed among other data mining techniques. 
The proposed scheme is trained and tested on a practical radial distribution system with six-
1.67 MW Doubly-Fed Induction Generators (DFIG-DGs) wind turbines. Various scenarios of 
DFIG-DG operating conditions with different types of disturbances for critical breakers are 
simulated. Conventional passive anti-islanding relays incorrectly detected 67.3% of non-
islanding scenarios. In other words, the security is as low as 32.3%.  The obtained results 
indicate that the proposed approach can be used to theoretically increase the security to 
100%. Therefore, the overall reliability of the system is substantially increased. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
Electric power distribution systems have traditionally been designed assuming that the 
primary substation is the sole source of power and short-circuit capacity. Distributed 
resources invalidate this assumption by placing power sources onto the distribution 
system. As a result, DR interconnection results in operating situations that do not occur in 
a conventional system without generation directly connected at the distribution level. 
Careful engineering can effectively eliminate the potentially adverse impacts that DR 
penetration could impress on the electric delivery system, such as exposing system and 
customer equipment to potential damage, decrease in power quality, decrease in 
reliability, extended time to restoration after outage, and potential risks to public and 
worker safety. There are different system issues which may be encountered as DR 
penetrates into a distribution system. These issues will not always occur, and are not very 
likely to occur at very low penetrations [1-5]. 
1.1 Voltage issues 
Load currents through the power and distribution transformer and line impedances cause 
voltage drops, which reduce voltage magnitude at the loads. Voltage magnitudes at 
service locations must be maintained within specified ranges. This is accomplished in 
both fixed designs of the system (e.g., conductor selection, substation and distribution 
transformer tap settings and fixed capacitor banks) and by voltage control equipment 
such as automatic load tap changers, step-type voltage regulators (SVR), and switched 
capacitors. The fixed design of the feeder is based on the assumption that loading profiles 
generally follow a predictable pattern, with real power loading on the feeder causing 
voltage to decrease monotonically from the substation. SVR controls continuously 
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monitor voltages and load currents to adjust tap positions accordingly. Capacitors 
(switched and fixed) compensate reactive current, reducing the current from the source to 
the capacitor location, resulting in reduced line voltage drop. However, capacitors will 
cause a current increase in feeders if the capacitor size is greater than the load reactive 
demand due to overcompensation. This will also happen if the capacitor size meets the 
reactive demand of the total distributed load connected to a feeder, but is installed at a 
location where it compensates more than the downstream reactive power demand, 
resulting in voltage increase. When a distributed generation (DG) is interconnected to the 
distribution system, it can significantly change the system voltage profile and interact 
with SVR and/or capacitor control operations. 
1.2 Protection issues 
1.2.1 Fuse coordination 
One of the first things utility engineers expect to be sacrificed as the amount of DG on a 
distribution feeder increases is the ability to save fuses for temporary faults. This is a 
difficult task without the extra infeed from DG. DG contributes additional current to the 
fuse and slightly reduces the current seen by the breaker. This tightens the already slim 
timing margin available in this process. The DG contribution should make permanent 
fault coordination more certain.  
1.2.2 Feeding fault (I2t) after utility protection (Recloser, Breaker, 
etc.) opens 
Ideally, all DG would disconnect by early in the first reclose interval so that the utility 
fault clearing equipment can proceed normally. Failure to have the proper protection has 
several potentially negative consequences, including:  
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1) The fault does not clear requiring the breakers to go through at least one more 
reclose cycle. One adverse effect this has is that it subjects substation transformers to 
unnecessary short circuit forces.  
2) Allowing the fault arc to continue to burn causes more damage to conductors and 
insulators. Even for restorable insulation, this means that the chances of future 
failures are greater. 
3) If the DG remains on line during the reclose interval, it can be damaged upon 
reclosing of the utility breaker. This is particularly true of synchronous machines. 
Out-of-phase reclosing can also result in transient overvoltages, high 
electromechanical torques on customer equipment, and much greater inrush currents 
than for normal reclosing. 
1.2.3 Impact of DG on interrupting ratings of Devices 
DG, particularly those using synchronous generators, can increase the amount of fault 
current flowing through utility breakers, reclosers, and fuses. Some utility systems will 
already have locations where these devices are at their limits with the normal contribution 
from the utility system. This can also occur at the low-voltage level, which might be 
customer-owned. Failure to identify these situations could result in increased failures of 
fault interrupters. The amount of fault current contributed by DG varies widely. Inverter-
based DG may supply twice rated current for a brief period. The concern occurs when the 
contribution is still there once the contacts part in the interrupting device. Rotating 
machines can contribute several times rated current for prolonged periods. This includes 
induction machines, which some would believe to be benign. Most faults do not result in 
a complete collapse of voltage and there may very well be sufficient excitation available 
to supply a fault. 
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1.2.4 Faults on adjacent feeder – nuisance or sympathetic tripping 
Faults on adjacent feeders cause two problems related to DG. 
1) DG is supposed to trip off line when it senses something wrong on the utility 
system. Voltage is the key sensing quantity. Unfortunately, faults on adjacent feeders 
create very similar voltages as faults on the DG feeder and it is difficult to 
discriminate. The usual effect is that the DG is tripped off too often, which is a 
common complaint, especially when the DG is located near the substation. 
2) The DG feeds the faults on an adjacent feeder back through the DG feeder’s 
breaker. Most feeders do not have directional sensing on the overcurrent relays. This 
can easily result in sympathetic tripping of the DG feeder’s breaker for faults 
elsewhere in the system. 
1.2.5 Fault detection – relay desensitizing 
As the penetration of DG increases on a distribution feeder, the contribution of the DG to 
faults makes it more difficult for conventional utility relays to detect, or sense, the 
presence of high-impedance faults. Utility fault detection on distribution systems is 
almost universally based on overcurrent. The devices are set to “see” a certain minimum 
fault current, which normally includes the ends of the feeder with some margin. As more 
DG is installed out on the feeder, it will cut into the margin. The solution is generally to 
add another fault interrupter (e.g., a line recloser) in the circuit to extend the zone of 
protection. 
1.2.6 Ground source impact 
Many argue that the best connection for DG is grounded wye-delta (grounded wye on the 
utility side). In fact, this is the way most utility-owned generation is connected at the 
transmission system level. The protection considerations for this connection are well 
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known. It is also a little more tolerant of generator imperfections such as third harmonic 
voltage generation. Unfortunately, this connection is not permitted on most utility 
distribution systems without considerable study. The main reason is that the ground fault 
contribution from the transformer alone can be sufficient to upset the ground fault 
coordination of the utility breakers and reclosers, which do not typically use directional 
sensing. 
The grounding (zero sequence admittance), provided by the DG installation, must be 
compatible with the distribution system to which it is connected. In uni-grounded and 
ungrounded systems, sensitive ground fault relaying is typically used. Therefore, a DG 
interconnection must not provide a ground source. In multi-grounded wye systems, too 
strong of a ground source can desensitize ground fault detection schemes. However, there 
is a risk that, if no ground source is provided by the DG, overvoltages could occur if the 
feeder becomes islanded during a ground fault. This is discussed later in the section on 
islanding considerations. 
1.2.7 One phase interruption on 3 phase line – loss of 1 or 2 
phases 
Negative sequence currents can cause severe overheating of rotating machines in a 
relatively short time. Therefore, rotating machine DG is usually equipped with some 
means of sensing unbalance on the incoming utility feed as a means of protecting the 
generator. This is also sometimes a more sensitive means of detecting utility-side faults 
so that the disconnection can be accomplished more promptly. This is normally desirable, 
but there are some considerations. For example, when the disconnection takes place on 
the low-voltage side of the service transformer, this leaves the transformer isolated on the 
open phase condition with no load. This is a prime condition for ferroresonance, which 
can result in damage to the transformer or some load-side devices that remain connected. 
For this reason, it is generally considered good practice to avoid using fuses and single-
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phase reclosers or sectionalizers between a 3-phase DG and the next three-phase breaker 
or recloser upline from the DG. 
1.2.8 Recloser coordination: 
DG is expected to disconnect by early in the first reclose interval after a recloser has 
operated. Two potential conflicts with common utility practices arise. 
1) Many utilities employ what is known as “instantaneous” reclose, which is 
commonly 12–18 cycles. This is done to reduce power quality complaints from their 
customers. If there is any delay at all in the detection of the fault by the DR relaying 
and the disconnection by the DG switchgear, there is a significant risk that the DR 
will still be connected when the recloser re-energizes the circuit. 
2) Reclosers that are used for fuse saving interrupt the fault current very quickly. 
While they may be rated for 3-cycle interruption, the EPRI DPQ project captured 
many interruptions as fast as 1.5 cycles. This makes it very difficult for DR protection 
devices to detect the fault before the utility system operates. Many devices have a 6- 
or 10-cycle time delay. Thus, if the voltage seen from the DG does not promptly 
deviate from normal after the recloser opens, there is a good chance the DG will still 
be connected upon reclosure or the fault arc will not clear due to prolonged in-feed 
from the DG. 
1.2.9 Conductor burn-down: 
Conductor burn-down is a potential adverse side effect of any of: 
1) Prolonged fault clearing due to relay desensitization 
2) Failure to clear the fault due to DR in-feed 
3) Increased fault current due to DR in-feed 
7 
 
1.3 Loss of power grid 
Separation of an operating DR from the utility source is called islanding. Opening of a 
utility circuit breaker, recloser, fuse, or other interrupting device can result in a DG 
becoming islanded along with a portion of the utility system and other utility customers. 
Unless the system is carefully designed for intentional islanded operation, unintentional 
islanding places the system at risk for a number of reasons, including overvoltage and 
damage to equipment. 
1.3.1 Vulnerability 
The risks of sustained energization by a DG of an unintentional island are dependent on 
the generation technology: 
1) Synchronous generators supply their own excitation from onboard rectifiers. 
Special detection methods are required to determine that a primary source supply 
system outage has occurred, and a method must be devised for deciding whether there 
should be an automatic disconnection. Unlike induction generators, synchronous 
generators are not held in synchronism with a common source. Thus, where two or 
more are to be paralleled, some means must be provided to synchronize them as they 
are brought onto the line and to maintain them synchronized as they run. 
2) Induction generators, on the other hand, depend upon the utility supply for 
excitation. Thus, they are never independent of the line. However, induction 
generating equipment with significant capacitance can become self-excited upon loss 
of the primary source and experience severe overvoltage as a result. Induction 
generators are simple to parallel because they automatically synchronize with the 
source field excitation (usually the utility service). 
8 
 
3) The ability of an electronic power converter (inverter) to continue operation when 
islanded depends upon the type of inverter (current source or voltage source) and the 
method of control. Current-source inverters, based on thyristors, are not generally 
capable of continued sourcing of an isolated system. Voltage-source inverters, which 
are now more common, are capable of islanded operation. However, voltage-source 
inverters intended solely for grid-parallel operation are typically controlled as virtual 
current sources and will generally not continue operating in an islanded system unless 
the connected load (real and reactive) is closely matched with the generated power. 
1.3.2 Overvoltages due to islanding: 
Islanding can lead to severe overvoltages on the islanded system due to loss of 
grounding, self-excitation, or a combination of these phenomena. 
1) Loss of Grounding in Multi-Grounded Wye Systems: A single phase fault can 
cause a breaker or recloser to operate, islanding the DG and a portion of the 
distribution system. This isolates the island from the ground source provided by the 
substation. If the DG does not provide adequate grounding, the un-faulted phase 
voltages to ground can rise to values on the order of 1.5 to 2 times rated voltage. 
Although the island should not persist long, these overvoltages can be damaging to 
utility equipment, particularly surge arresters, and customer equipment. Therefore, it 
is necessary that the DR installation provides a grounding source, or other means of 
ensuring primary- side overvoltages will not occur for even a brief period. Too strong 
of a grounding source, however, can desensitize feeder ground current relaying, and 
may expose the grounding equipment to excess duty from utility faults, load 
unbalance, and open-line conditions. 
2) Self-Excitation: Islanding a rotating generator DG with a portion of a distribution 
system having excess capacitive compensation can result in high overvoltages due to 
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self-excitation of the machine. Saturation of transformers in the isolated subsystem 
introduces large harmonic current components which can resonate in the circuit 
formed by the DG and the capacitive compensation. Although saturation reduces the 
fundamental overvoltage to some degree, the potentially large harmonic voltage 
components can result in very high peak overvoltages. This can result in failure of 
utility and customer equipment. 
1.3.3 Coordination with reclosing 
The usual practice on overhead radial feeders is to automatically reclose circuit breakers 
and circuit reclosers after a trip. Typically, several reclose attempts will be made. The 
delay time on the initial reclose attempt can be very short, on the order of 200 ms open-
close cycle time, if an “instantaneous” setting is used. If a DG connected to the 
downstream side of the breaker or recloser is not removed prior to the reclose, the reclose 
can be into an energized system which is not synchronized with the system on the source 
side of the switchgear. It is possible that the two systems are 180 out of phase. If an out-
of-phase reclose occurs, a very severe transient is produced. While such a reclose is often 
considered only a threat to the DG, it can also have severe impact on the local 
distribution system and its customers. 
The utility and customer impacts of out-of-phase reclosing include: 
1) A severe switching surge, with voltage magnitude ideally approaching 3 p.u. in a 
lightly damped system. Fig. 1 illustrates a simulated out-of-step reclose transient. 
2) Large simultaneous inrush currents into transformers and motors, which could 
cause nuisance operation of fuses and other overcurrent protective devices on the 
utility system and within customer facilities. 




Fig. 1. Out of step reclosing transient 
 
1.4 Anti-islanding protection schemes 
Anti-islanding protection or islanding detection schemes can be classified into remote 
(communication-based) and local techniques as shown in Fig. 2 [6]. 
 
Fig. 2. Classification of islanding detection schemes 
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1.4.1 Remote Schemes 
Remote schemes are based on communication between the grid and the DG. It has a 
better reliability than local techniques but more expensive. 
1.4.1.1 Power-line communication 
In power-line communication (PLC), a signal is continuously sent from the grid to the 
DG. The island is detected by checking the signal continuity where the power line is used 
as the communication medium. This technique can be used for synchronous machine-
based DG [7-9]. The PLC technique includes a signal generator connected to the grid and 
a signal detector at the DG. 
1.4.1.2 Supervisory control and data acquisition 
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) can be used for island detection. 
SCADA system consists of a master unit and a number of distributed remote terminal 
units (RTUs) connected to the master via varieties of communication channels [10-13] 
Speed of data acquisition and control is affected by the communication channel. 
1.4.1.3 Transfer trip 
Transfer-trip (TT) technique is a complicated island detection technique. In [14], a 
protective relaying over fiber optics was discussed to provide a reliable and economical 
installation. A method is described for the measurement of the probability of error due to 
noise in TT relaying in. TT channel should be reliable and insensitive to noise. 
1.4.2 Local Schemes 
Local techniques are based on data at the DG site and can be classified into two types. 
1.4.2.1 Active schemes 
Active techniques are designed to force the DG to be unstable in island mode and interact 
with the operation of the power system directly. The main advantage of the active 
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techniques over passive techniques is their small NDZ [15]. An attractive technique to 
implement an active island detection is to drift the frequency or the PCC voltage till the 
under frequency relay/over frequency relay (OF/UF) or under voltage relay/over voltage 
relay (OV/UV), respectively, is tripped. 
1) Impedance detection: To implement the grid impedance detection technique, 
the inverter-based distributed generation (IBDG) periodically adds a disturbance 
to its output current. If the PCC voltage presents no change during the 
disturbance, the IBDG assumes that the grid (usually has a low source impedance) 
is still maintaining the PCC voltage and the IBDG operation continues. If the PCC 
voltage presents a disturbance corresponding to the current disturbance, the 
impedance at the IBDG terminals is higher than the case when the grid is 
connected [6]. 
2) Change of output power: In this technique, the output power of the IBDG is 
changed periodically to break source-load balance condition. This technique is 
impractical as timing synchronization must be made among all the IBDGs in the 
power system or it will not work because of the averaging effect [6]. 
3) Automatic Phase Shift: Automatic phase shift (APS) is based on changing the 
starting angle of the IBDG output current according to the frequency of the IBDG 
terminal voltage. An additional phase shift is introduced each time the frequency 
of the terminal voltage stabilizes. The frequency of the terminal voltage keeps 
deviating until OF or UF is tripped [6]. 
4) Active Frequency Drift: In active frequency drift (AFD) technique, the current 
is slightly distorted presenting a zero-current segment. When the grid is 
disconnected, the phase difference between the IBDG voltage and the current is 
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load dependent. In order to eliminate the phase difference, the frequency drifts up 
or down till the OF/UF is tripped [6].  
5) Slip Mode Frequency Shift: Slip mode frequency shift (SMFS) is similar to 
AFD except that the starting angle of the IBDG output current also varies with 
frequency at each zero crossing of the terminal voltage. SMFS technique applies a 
positive feedback to shift the phase (therefore frequency) of the PCC voltage [6]. 
6) Reactive Power Export Error: Reactive power export error is an improved 
phase shift where the reactive power of the system is changed periodically. The 
periodical change of the reactive power introduces a phase shift between the 
output current and voltage, which increases or decreases the frequency of the load 
voltage in the island condition and therefore the OF/UF is tripped [6].  
7) Sandia Frequency Shift: Sandia frequency shift (SFS) technique is based on 
inserting a zero-current segment per half of the line cycle. A positive feedback is 
used to increase the chopping factor [6]. 
8) Sandia Voltage Shift: Sandia voltage shift (SVS) technique is very similar to 
the SFS, except that it applies a variation to the PCC voltage amplitude instead of 
frequency [6]. 
9) Harmonic Current Injection: Harmonic current injection technique is based on 
injecting a disturbance into the grid through either the d-axis or the q-axis current 
components of the IBDG [6]. 
1.4.2.2 Passive schemes 
Passive techniques are based on measuring a system parameter(s) and comparing it with a 
preset threshold. The main problem when designing a passive islanding detection 
technique is the choice of a suitable measure and adjusting its threshold value. Passive 
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techniques have a large NDZ compared to active techniques. Several passive islanding 
detection techniques are described in the following subsections. 
1) Over/Under Voltage (OV/UV): OV/UV island detection technique is one of the 
simplest passive techniques used in islanding detection. This technique is based 
on the voltage change introduced in island [6]. This islanding detection method is 
based on reactive power imbalance between DGs and loads at occurrence of 
islanding [16-17]. As a disadvantage, if the load power and the DG-generated 
power in island are matched, the change in voltage and frequency is very small. 
An algorithm for voltage sag detection based on rectified voltage processing is 
presented in [18]. The algorithm detects voltage sag that can be used to trigger the 
island detection technique if it exceeds a certain threshold. The time for island 
detection is less than a quarter of the supply voltage period [6]. 
2) Over/Under Frequency (OF/UF): OF/UF is obtained from voltage signals and 
is based on the mismatch between DG real power and loads at the instant of 
islanding. The frequency variation during disturbance events is caused by the 
change of the current through the DG reactance. The current changes in a short 
time (∆t) causing a DG terminal voltage vector shift (∆θ) that leads to frequency 
changes (∆f = ∆θ/∆t) for synchronous DGs. However, in case of induction DGs, 
besides the frequency change due to vector shift, the alteration in the power flow 
during disturbance changes the DG slip that further impacts the frequency 
changes [16-17]. 
3) Rate-of-Change of Active Power: In islanding condition, the active power 
variation flows directly into the load varying the PCC voltage. This voltage 
variation can be an indication for islanding [19-20]. 
4) Rate-of-Change of Frequency (ROCOF): Fig. 3 presents an equivalent circuit 
of a synchronous generator equipped with a ROCOF relay operating in parallel 
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with a distribution network. In this figure, a synchronous generator (SG) feeds a 
load (L). The difference between the electrical powers supplied by the generator 
and consumed by the load is provided (or consumed) by the main grid. Therefore, 
the system frequency remains constant. If the circuit breaker (CB) opens, due to a 
fault for example, the system composed by the generator and the load becomes 
islanded. In this case, there is an electrical power imbalance due to the lost grid 
power (Psys). This power imbalance causes transients in the islanded system and 
the system frequency starts to vary dynamically. Such system behavior can be 
used to detect an islanding condition. However, if the power imbalance in the 
islanded system is small, then the frequency will change slowly. Thus, the rate of 
change of frequency can be used to accelerate the islanding detection for this 
situation. 
 
Fig. 3. An equivalent circuit of a synchronous generator with ROCOF in parallel 
with the distribution system 
The rate of change of frequency is calculated considering a measure window over 
a few cycles, usually between 2 and 50 cycles. This signal is processed by filters 
and then the resulting signal is used to detect islanding. If the value of the rate of 
change of frequency is higher than a threshold value, a trip signal is immediately 
sent to the generator CB. Typical ROCOF settings installed in 60-Hz systems are 
between 0.10 and 1.20 Hz/s. Another important characteristic available in these 
relays is a block function by minimum terminal voltage. If the terminal voltage 
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drops below an adjustable level (Vmin), the trip signal from the ROCOF relay is 
blocked. This is to avoid, for example, the actuation of the ROCOF relay during 
generator start-up or short circuits [21]. 
There are also some other methods that are rarely used to detect anti-islanding incidents 
as following: 
5) Comparison of Rate-of-Change of Frequency (COROCOF): COROCOF is 
based on the sudden change in frequency due to the loss of mains as in [22]. 
Compared to ROCOF, COROCOF discriminates between changes in frequency 
due to loss of mains and changes due to system disturbances. COROCOF 
compares the DG frequency with the grid frequency, hence the name COROCOF. 
6) Phase Jump Detection: When the grid is disconnected, the phase angle between 
the output current and the PCC voltage is load dependant [23]. If the change in the 
phase angle exceeds a pre-set threshold, the island is detected. 
7) Vector Surge Relays: Vector surge relay (VSR) (known as vector shift or 
voltage jump relay) is employed for island detection in [21] and [24-26]. When 
the gird is disconnected, the DG starts to decelerate or accelerate because of the 
power imbalance between the DG and the load; therefore, the terminal voltage 
vector changes. VSR updates its measured parameter every zero crossing (rising) 
of the terminal voltage. This relay has a blocking function triggered by a 
minimum terminal voltage. If the terminal voltage drops below a voltage 
threshold, the tripping signal from the VSR is blocked, avoiding tripping for the 
generator start-up or short circuits.  
8) Wavelet: Wavelet can be used for island detection. A computation of 
continuous wavelet transform via a new wavelet function is proposed for the 
visualisation of electric power system disturbances in [27] and [28]. The discrete 
wavelet transform for electric power system was presented in [29]. In [30], a 
technique of ground fault detection using wavelets is introduced. 
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9) Neural Networks: An attempt to develop a technique for island detection based 
on the application of Artificial Neural Network (ANN) was reported in [31]. The 
NN architecture used for island detection is based on back propagation, which 
consists of an input layer, an output layer and hidden layers. 
10) Kalman Filter: A Kalman filter is implemented in [32] for island detection. 
That technique is based on energy mismatch between the estimated third and fifth 
harmonics and the real ones. 
1.5 Problem formulation 
As was discussed, the most suitable protection scheme for distribution system level in 
terms of capital investment and complexity is passive anti-islanding protection scheme. 
However, based on how relay settings are set, it will suffer from either low security or 
low dependability. If the relays are set in order to detect all incidents that should be 
detected as fault, it will sacrifice security and if the relays are set in such a way that they 
do not detect incidents that should not be detected, it will sacrifice dependability. This 
will be shown in the next section on the case study system. 
Therefore, there is a need to find a solution which optimizes security or dependability and 
thus increases the overall reliability. Next section will investigate the problem in more 
details through simulations on a practical distribution system. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Passive anti-islanding protection scheme modeling 
2.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters presented basic concepts of protection and principles of operation of 
distance and differential relays. Modern digital and numerical relays are widely employed 
in protection systems nowadays. Designing and modeling of numerical relay require 
establishing a generalized numerical relay structure, which is composed by the more 
relevant and common internal modules employed by typical numerical relays. The 
present chapter discusses the functionality of each of the internal modules of the 
generalized numerical relay, namely signal conditioning and scaling module, analog anti-
aliasing filtering module, analog-to-digital conversion module, phasor estimation 
algorithm and relay logic. The most common techniques and methods employed in each 
of these internal modules are enumerated and reviewed. 
2.1.1 Relay performance 
The following characteristics are related with a good performance of a relay in a power 
system [33-34]. 
1) Reliability: The reliability of a relay is directly in correspondence with the 
concepts of dependability and security. A relay is said to be dependable when it 
operates in the occurrence of a fault relevant to its protection zone. Security is 
reached either when the relay will not operate for a fault outside its operating 
zone, or when the system is in a healthy state. 
2) Selectivity: Selectivity is the ability that a relay has to only open those breakers 
that isolate the faulted element. Selectivity discrimination can be achieved by time 
19 
 
grading or by unit protection. Selectivity by time grading means that different 
zones of operation are graded by time and that in the occurrence of a fault, 
although a number of protections equipment respond, only those relevant to the 
faulty zone complete the tripping function. Selectivity by unit protection means 
that the relay will only operate under certain fault conditions occurring within a 
clearly defined zone. 
3) Speed: In the occurrence of a fault, the greater the time in which the fault is 
affecting the power system, the greater is the risk that the power system falls into 
an unstable operation point. Relays are therefore required to clear the fault as 
quickly as possible. 
4) Sensitivity: The relay is said to be sensitive if the relay operates to the 
minimum value of faulted input signals. 
2.1.2 Relay technology 
The relay application for protection of power system date back nearly 100 years ago. 
Since then, the technology employed to construct relays have improved dramatically 
relay size, weight, cost and functionality. Based on the technology employed for their 
construction, relays can be chronologically classified as electromechanical, static or 
solid-state, digital and numerical [34]. 
1) Electromechanical relays: The first relays employed in the electric industry 
were electromechanical devices. These relays worked based on creating a 
mechanical force to operate the relay contacts in response to a fault situation. The 
mechanical force was established by the flow of a current that reflected the fault 
current through windings mounted in magnetic cores. Due to the nature of its 
principle of operation, electromechanical relays are relatively heavier and bulkier 
than relays constructed with other technologies. Besides, the burden of these 
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relays can be extremely high, affecting protection purposes. However, 
electromechanical relays were so largely employed, tested and known that even 
modern relays employ their principle of operation, and still represent a good 
choice for certain conditions of application. 
2) Solid-state relays: With the advances on electronics, the electromechanical 
technology presented in the relays of the first generation started to be replaced by 
static relays in the early 60’s. Static relays defined the operating characteristic 
based in analog circuitry rather than in the action of windings and coils. The 
advantages that static relays showed over electromechanical relays were a reduced 
size, weight and electrical burden. However, static relays showed some 
disadvantages since analog circuitry is extremely affected by electromagnetic 
interference and the ranges of current and voltages values are strongly restricted 
in analog circuits, affecting the sensitivity of the relay. 
3) Digital relays: Incorporating microprocessor into the architecture of relay to 
implement relay and logic functions started happening in the 80’s. Digital relays 
incorporated analog-to-digital converter (ADC) to sample the analog signals 
incoming from instrument transformers, and used microprocessor to define the 
logic of the relay. Digital relays presented an improvement in accuracy and 
control over incoming signals, and the use of more complexes relay algorithms, 
extra relay functions and complementary task. 
4) Numerical relays: The difference between numerical relays and digital relays 
lies in the kind of microprocessor used. Numerical relays use digital signal 
processors (DSP) cards, which contain dedicated microprocessors especially 
designed to perform digital signal processing. 
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2.2 Digital and numerical relay models 
Modeling and simulation of electric power systems has been a common practice for more 
than thirty years. Computer models of major power system components have been used 
in software packages such as short circuit programs, load flow, stability programs, and 
electromagnetic transient programs. Relay system modeling has been performed in a 
lesser degree. 
A successful relay model must produce the same output for the same inputs than its real 
counterpart, even when there would not be a direct correspondence to the actual 
microprocessor machine language coding within the relay. 
Utility engineers and consultants use relay models to select the relay types suited for a 
particular application, and to analyze the performance of relays that appear to either 
operate incorrectly or fail to operate on the occurrence of a fault. Instead of using actual 
prototypes, manufacturers use relay model designing to expedite and economize the 
process of developing new relays. Electric power utilities use computer-based relay 
models to confirm how the relay would perform during systems disturbances and normal 
operating conditions and to make the necessary corrective adjustment on the relay 
settings. The software models could be used for training young and inexperienced 
engineers and technicians. Researchers use relay model designing to investigate and 
improve protection design and algorithms. However, choosing appropriate settings for the 
steady state operation of overcurrent relays and distance relays is presently the most 
familiar use of relay models. 
The purpose for which a relay model is to be used determines the amount of detail 
required in the representation of the actual relay. Based on this, digital and numerical 
relay models can be divided into two categories. The models of the first category 
consider only the fundamental frequency components of voltages and currents. Phasor 
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based models were the first to be widely used to design and apply relays. The models of 
the second category take into consideration the high frequency and decaying DC 
components of voltages and currents in addition to the fundamental frequency 
components. These models are called transient models of relays [35]. 
2.2.1 Phasor relay models 
The primary limitation of phasor models is their inability to handle and account for some 
components of the inputs, such as the DC offset, nonlinearities of current transformers 
and voltage transformers, and protective relay memory circuits losing stored voltage or 
current data. 
In spite of their limitations, phasor models provide the ability to observe, usually by 
graphical plots, the margin between the boundary of operation and the parameters that are 
calculated by the relay. This ability, which is common to all relay models, is very helpful 
in developing reliable protection applications and settings. Phasor-based models can be 
used, among others, for the following purposes: 
1) Modeling of time-graded overcurrent characteristics. 
2)  Setting and adjustment of instantaneous relays. 
3) Modeling of the characteristic of a directional overcurrent relay on the complex 
plane. 
4) Modeling of the characteristic of a power relay plotted in the P-Q plane. 
5) Modeling of the characteristic of a percentage restrained differential relay 
plotted in   the differential-restrain current plane. 
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2.2.2 Generalized numerical relay structure 
McLaren was the first to propose the concept of Open System Relaying, where different 
relay functions can be obtained from the same hardware just by modifying 
microprocessor programming. Modern relay technology has shown recently a tendency 
towards this direction. 
The generalized numerical relay concept, which is directly derived from open system 
relaying, consists of a minimum set of hardware modules and functions of modern digital 
and numerical relays. With the generalized numerical relay and with the amount of 
information commonly available, it is possible to recreate the majority of modern digital 
and numerical relay equipment. The following hardware modules and functions 
constitute the generalized numerical relay. 
1) Isolation and analog signal scaling: Current and voltage waveforms from 
instrument transformers are acquired and scaled down to convenient voltage 
levels for use in the digital and numerical relays. 
2) Analog anti-aliasing filtering: Low-pass filters are used to avoid the 
phenomena of aliasing in which the high frequency components of the inputs 
appear to be parts of the fundamental frequency components. 
3) Analog-to-digital conversion: Because digital processors can process 
numerical or logical data only, the waveforms of inputs must be sampled at 
discrete times. To achieve this, each analog signal is passed through a sample-
and-hold module, and conveyed, one at a time, to an Analog-to-Digital Converter 
(ADC) by a multiplexer. 
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4) Phasor estimation algorithm: A software algorithm implemented in a 
microprocessor estimates the amplitude and phase of the waveforms provided to 
the relay. 
5) Relay algorithm and trip logic: The equations and parameters specific to the 
protection algorithm and the associated trip logic are implemented in the software 
of the microprocessor used in the relay. The microprocessor calculates the phasors 
representing the inputs, acquires the status of the switches, performs protective 
relay calculations, and finally provides outputs for controlling the circuit breakers. 
The processor may also support communications, self-testing, target display, time 
clocks, and other tasks. 
Fig. 4 shows the schematic of a generalized numerical relay structure. The functionalities 
of each module of the generalized relay model are developed in the following. 
 
Fig. 4. Generalized numerical relay structure. 
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2.2.3 Phasor estimation techniques and Discrete Fourier 
Transform (DFT) algorithm 
Modern numerical relays typically use 12, 16, 32, 48 or 64 samples per cycle. Among the 
various algorithms used for phasor estimation such as Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT), 
Least Error Square and Walsh Function, the most popular algorithm is the DFT. 
1) Discrete Fourier Transform: Extracting a single frequency component is often 
done with a “Fourier transform” calculation. In sampled data systems, this 
becomes the “discrete Fourier transform” (DFT). 
A periodic waveform can be expressed as a linear combination of two orthogonal 
functions. The DFT employs the sine and cosine functions, which are well known 
orthogonal functions, to estimate the phasors of sinusoidal waveforms. Two 
functions f(x) and g(x) are orthogonal over the interval [a, b] if the following 
expression is satisfied. 
< () ⊥ () >≡ 
 ()() = 0                  (1) 
The orthogonality of f(x) = sin (x) and g(x) = cos(x) in the interval [-π, +π] is 
determined by the following expression. 
< () ⊥ () >≡ 
 ()() = 0        (2) 
W = sin(x)⊥cos(x) is an orthonormal basis in the interval [-π, +π]. The projection 
of a function f(ωt) over the orthonormal basis W is: 
[()] =< (), () > () + 
                                                         < (), () > ()        (3) 
Consider that the phasor of the following sinusoidal waveform is to be estimated. 
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"() = #$( + %)                                    (4) 
The orthogonality of the sinusoidal waveform and the sine function is evaluated 
using Equation (5) as follows. 
< "(), () >≡ 
 (#$( + %)()) = &#$%        (5) 
Solving to the well-know expression Vp cosθ produces 
#$% = ' 
 (#$( + %)())

             (6) 
Similarly, the evaluation of the orthogonality of the sinusoidal waveform and the 
cosine function are given by the following equations. 
< "(), () >≡ 
 (#$( + %)()) = &#$%        (7) 
#$% = ' 
 (#$( + %)())

             (8) 
If the voltage waveform of Equation (4) is sampled N times at a ∆t sampling step 
in the interval of one period, then Equations (6) and (8) estimate the real and 
imaginary components of the phasor of the waveform defined by Equation (4). 
()(#)  =  #$% = *+ ∑ "-(+-.' ∆)                    (9) 
01(#)  =  #$% = *+ ∑ "-(+-.' ∆)                    (10) 
Equations (9) and (10) imply that the sine and cosine functions must be sampled 
at the same rate at which the voltage waveform v was sampled. The first sample in 
the sampling window of the voltage waveform is multiplied by the first sample in 
the sine or cosine function, the second sample in the sampling window is 
multiplied by the second sample in the sine or cosine function, and so on. 
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2.3 Overcurrent (OC) relay 
When a fault occurs on a power system, the fault current is almost always greater than the 
pre- fault load current in any power system element. A very simple and effective relaying 
principle is that of using the current magnitude as an indicator of a fault. Overcurrent 
relays (as such relays are known) can be used to protect practically any power system 
element, i.e. transmission lines, transformers, generators, or motors.  
Generally, there are two types of overcurrent relays: 1) Inverse Definite Minimum Time 
(IDMT) overcurrent. 2) Instantaneous overcurrent. For our purpose of islanding detection 
studies, we will only consider the IDMT characteristics. 
A typical IDMT characteristic is as follows: 
For M > 1:  t(I) = TD ( 234' + 5)                                    (11) 
For M < 1:  t(I) = TD ( 6738')                                            (12) 
Where: M is the ratio of current to pick-up current and TD is the Time Dial. Other 
constants are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Different IDMT characteristic parameters for relay modeling 
Characteristics A B P Tr 
Inverse 0.0515 0.114 0.02 4.85 
Very Inverse 19.61 0.0491 2 21.6 
Extremely Inverse 28.2 0.1217 2 29.1 
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The digital implementation of the overcurrent is based on what is explained above. 
However, there is a need to define another parameter which is the inverse integration of 
time (t) over the period starting from the time at which M becomes larger than 1 as 
follows: 
S(t) = 
 '9                                                          (13) 
The integration continues until S(t) becomes equal or larger than 1. Only in this case a 
trip signal is issued by the relay [36]. 
2.4 Over/Under voltage (OV/UV) relay 
The over/under voltage relays can be either of IDMT or Definite Time type. The tripping 
characteristics of IDMT type are shown below: 
OV time = :;<=(>?@)  )                                    (14) 
UV time = :;<=(*A?@)  )                                 (15) 
Where, K is the time dial setting with range 0.1 to 1.0 sec and Ovf and Uvf are 
BCDEFCG ?;EC
DC9 ?;EC . 
The tripping characteristics of Definite Time relay can be adjusted with a certain time 
(from 0 to 300 sec). 
In this work, we have considered the IDMT OV/UV relay for our islanding detection 
studies [37]. 
2.5 Over/Under frequency (OF/UF) relay 
Generally, the phasor estimation unit has a frequency estimation algorithm which tracks 
the frequency and gives the correct frequency to the phasor estimation algorithm 
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described in previous sections. Moreover, this frequency is used as an input to the OF/UF 
and ROCOF relays for other applications such as, V/Hz, load shedding, and anti-
islanding protection. 
There are several algorithms used for frequency estimation such as, DFT iterative 
technique, least error squares technique and Newton-type algorithms. The LES and 
Newton-type techniques require considerable computational resources and, therefore, the 
iterative DFT-based technique is considered in this work. 
The technique considers that samples of a signal having fundamental frequency of f0 Hz 
are taken at a pre-specified sampling rate. It is possible to design orthogonal filters for 
extracting the real and imaginary parts of the fundamental frequency component of the 
signal. The real and imaginary parts, Vr, and Vi, computed using samples corresponding 
to the nth data window can be used to estimate the phase angle, θn, of the fundamental 
frequency phasor corresponding to the nth window by using the following expression: 
%H = I'(JKJ7)                           (16) 
As the next sample arrives, the data window is shifted by one sample. The phase angle, 
θn+1, of the fundamental frequency phasor corresponding to the (n+l)th data window can 
be computed using the data from the (n+l)th window and coefficients of the orthogonal 
filters. The phase angle difference, (θn+1- θn), represents the rotation of the phasor in one 
sampling interval. This rotation for a phasor having fundamental frequency of f0 will 
equal to: 




Equation (17) is only true if the phase angles, θn+1 and θn, are computed using the 
orthogonal filters which are designed by assuming the fundamental frequency of the 
signal being equal to f0. In spite of this, Equation (17) forms the basis for frequency 
estimation and estimate of the frequency, f ^, can be obtained as follows: 
^ = QRSTQR* @OU                                 (18) 
One of the following two situations can exist: 
1) The estimated frequency is equal to the fundamental frequency assumed for designing 
the orthogonal filters that are used to compute phase angles, θn+1 and θn. This means that 
the estimated frequency is also the fundamental frequency of the signal. 
2) The estimated frequency is not equal to the fundamental frequency assumed for 
designing the orthogonal filters. This means that the estimated frequency is not the 
fundamental frequency of the signal. However, to achieve Situation A, the phase angles 
need to be calculated using orthogonal filters designed by assuming the fundamental 
frequency being equal to the fundamental frequency of the signal. This can be achieved 
by using an iterative procedure as follows: 
(i) Design new orthogonal filters by assuming the fundamental frequency of the 
signal being equal to the latest estimate of the frequency obtained from Equation 
(18). 
(ii) Compute the phase angles, θn+1 and θn, using the orthogonal filters designed in 




(iii) Estimate the frequency using Equation (16) and the phase angles computed in 
step (ii).  
(iv) Check if the estimated frequency from step (iii) is equal to the fundamental 
frequency assumed for designing the filters in step (i). If it is, the estimated 
frequency in step (iii) is the fundamental frequency of the signal. Otherwise, the 
process reverts to step (i).  
It must be noted that an initial estimate of the frequency is assumed for starting the 
procedure for the first time. 
Over/under frequency relays, here, have definite time characteristics. This means that if 
the frequency estimated for any window is higher than over-frequency or lower than 
under-frequency values, a timer will start counting. If the timer exceeds the pre-specified 
time, the relay will send a trip signal. Note that if the frequency becomes in the non-trip 
region again, the timer will be reset and next time it will start from zero [38-39]. 
2.6 ROCOF relay 
The ROCOF relay uses the frequency obtained by the frequency estimation algorithm to 
find out if the absolute rate-of-change of frequency is higher than a setting value. This 
relay requires a minimum of 100 ms since the relay calculates the rate-of-change of 
frequency every 50 ms and needs two calculations for confirmation. Also, if the rate-of-
change of frequency is higher than the limits of the relay tracking algorithm, this element 
will not operate [16-17]. 
2.7 Vector Shift (VShift) relay 
VShift relays available in the market measure the duration time of an electrical cycle and 
start a new measurement at each zero rising crossing of the terminal voltage. The current 
cycle duration is compared with the last one [21]. In other words, two consecutive ∆θs 
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(or ∆*%) are calculated and compared. Therefore, the VShift relay works on the same 
basis as ROCOF relay by the following expression: 
( )19          
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Where, ∆t is the time step for ROCOF calculation and θ2, θ1, and θ0 are three consecutive 
phase angle calculations within the phasor estimation unit of the relay. Therefore, the 








Chapter 3  
3 Radial distribution system under study and DFIG 
modeling 
3.1 Radial distribution system 
Fig. 5 shows the practical local distribution company (LDC)’s radial distribution feeder, 
on which the conventional passive anti-islanding protection system and the proposed 
IDS-based system will be tested and verified. This distribution system is fed from a 
115/27.6-kV transmission substation. It is equipped with a capacitor bank on the main 
feeder, a main feeder breaker with an automatic recloser, single- and three-phase loads 
and transformers at different voltage levels, which are distributed along its main feeders 
and laterals with a total length of 40 km. Six 1.67 MW doubly-fed induction generator 
(DFIG) wind turbine DG units operating at unity power factor are installed 15 km away 
from the main breaker. These DFIG–DGs are interconnected with the grid at the point of 
common coupling (PCC) through a delta/star grounded (∆/Y) 27.6/2.3 kV transformer. 
The LDC’s distribution feeder is modeled as PI sections along with all of its loading 
detailed facilities. The DFIG wind-turbine DGs are simulated as an equivalent coherent 
unit (a total rated power of 10 MVA). In section 4.2, the DFIG and wind turbine unit 




Fig. 5. Radial distribution system under study 
3.2 Wind Power system 
In this section, a brief description of the DFIG-DG, the two back-to-back voltage-sourced 
converters, and the wind turbine model are presented. 
Fig. 6 illustrates the detailed schematic diagram of a wind-power system based on the 
doubly-fed induction generator [40]. The wind-power system utilizes a wind turbine that 
is mechanically coupled through a gearbox to the DFIG. The machine rotor circuit is 
interfaced with the PCC through an AC/DC/AC converter system. The two VSC systems 
are interfaced at their DC sides. The machine side of the converter is a variable-frequency 





Fig. 6. Wind power system structure 
In the system in Fig. 6, the variable-frequency VSC system controls the machine torque 
and the controlled DC-voltage power port has to regulate the DC-bus voltage irrespective 
of the power flow in the AC/DC/AC converter system. The DFIG-DG specifications are 
presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: DFIG-DG specifications 
Rate Output MVA 10 MVA 
Stator Voltage 2.3 kV 






The wind turbine is the variable speed turbine with three blades (MOD 2) with a unit 
responsible for Maximum Power Point Tracking (MPPT).  The turbine specifications are 
mentioned in Table 3. 
Table 3: Wind turbine specifications 
Rate MVA 10 MVA 
Rotor Radius 89.35 m 
Rotor Area 25590 m2 
Air Density 1.225 kg/m3 
Gearbox Efficiency 0.98 
Gearbox Ratio 220 
 
3.3 Simulations of distribution system with DFIG-DGs under 
two arbitrary operating conditions 
To get an insight into the distribution system, it is simulated under two arbitrary cases 
and the steady-state results with their corresponding graphs are obtained. The simulation 
cases are as follows: 
1) The system is simulated under the situation where the distribution load is the same as 
the DFIG output. In this case, the wind speed should be set to 8.63 m/s. The steady-state 
values of the distribution system are shown in Table 4. Note that the per-unitization is 




Table 4: Steady-state parameters for wind speed of 8.63 m/s 
Power System Parameter Steady-State Value 
DFIG Active Power (Pgen) in MW 3.3 
DFIG Reactive Power (Qgen) in MVAR -0.11 
Grid Active Power (Pgrid) in MW 0.00 
Grid Reactive Power (Qgen) in MVAR 0.33 
Load Active Power (Pload) in MW 3.29 
Load Reactive Power (Qload) in MVAR 0.22 
DFIG RMS Voltage phase A in p.u. 1.05 
DFIG RMS Voltage phase B in p.u. 1.05 
DFIG RMS Voltage phase C in p.u. 1.05 
DFIG RMS Current phase A in kA 0.92 
DFIG RMS Current phase B in kA 0.93 
DFIG RMS Current phase C in kA 0.92 
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Steady-state voltage and current waveforms for three phases are shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 
8, respectively. As can be seen, the distribution system is basically balanced. Fig. 9 
shows the steady-state frequency of the distribution system. 
 
Fig. 7. Steady-state voltage waveforms for case 1 
 




Fig. 9. Steady-state system frequency for case 1 
2) Another simulation case is when the active power from the grid is 14.3% of the power 
from DFIG-DGs. In this case, the wind speed is set to 8.3 m/s. The corresponding steady-
state values are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5: Steady-state parameters for wind speed of 8.3 m/s 
Power System Parameter Steady-State Value 
DFIG Active Power (Pgen) in MW 2.88 
DFIG Reactive Power (Qgen) in MVAR -0.11 
Grid Active Power (Pgrid) in MW 0.41 
Grid Reactive Power (Qgen) in MVAR 0.33 
Load Active Power (Pload) in MW 3.29 
Load Reactive Power (Qload) in MVAR 0.22 
DFIG RMS Voltage phase A in p.u. 1.05 
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DFIG RMS Voltage phase B in p.u. 1.05 
DFIG RMS Voltage phase C in p.u. 1.05 
DFIG RMS Current phase A in kA 0.82 
DFIG RMS Current phase B in kA 0.83 
DFIG RMS Current phase C in kA 0.82 
Fig. 10, Fig. 11, and Fig. 12 show steady-state voltage, current, and frequency waveforms 
respectively. 
 




Fig. 11. Steady-state current waveforms for case 2 
 




Chapter 4  
4 Conventional passive anti-islanding protection scheme 
simulation 
In this chapter, the complete modeled LDC’s distribution system with the detailed 
modeled wind power system is simulated under various operating conditions with 
different disturbance events in the PSCAD/EMTDC environment. Then, the PCC passive 
signals are fed into the detailed MATLAB-based modeled passive anti-islanding relays 
which are presented in chapter 3. Finally, the problems with the conventional protection 
system are listed.  
4.1 Testing Scenarios 
In order to test the conventional passive anti-islanding protection system, appropriate 
testing scenarios should be defined that can reflect its drawbacks. These scenarios should 
include different types of disturbances, manual breaker opening, three-phase and single-
phase faults, under various operating conditions at important breaker locations (should 
include both islanding and non-islanding) on the distribution system under study. 
Therefore, four breaker locations are considered as the following: 1) Breakers B#1 and 
B#2 for islanding events. 2) Breakers B#4 and B#6 for non-islanding events. The 
operating conditions are considered as in Table 6. As can be seen from Table 6, the 
scenarios include almost all possible operating conditions specially the ones around zero. 
Load-Generation Difference in percent (LGD %) is given as the following expression: 





Table 6: Testing scenario operating conditions 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
1 8.98 -12.57% 
2 8.89 -9.47% 
3 8.78 -5.57% 
4 8.72 -3.51% 
5 8.69 -2.29% 
6 8.66 -1.13% 
7 8.63 0% 
8 8.61 0.95% 
9 8.59 1.69% 
10 8.55 3.40% 
11 8.51 5.14% 
12 8.42 8.95% 
13 8.36 11.77% 
 
Further, 15 scenarios are also considered by suddenly decreasing the wind speed by 1 m/s 





Table 7: Sudden wind speed change by 1 m/s 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
1 9.2 -19.41% 
2 9.1 -16.40% 
3 9 -13.36% 
4 8.9 -10.06% 
5 8.8 -6.50% 
6 8.7 -2.78% 
7 8.67 -1.58% 
8 8.65 -0.84% 
9 8.63 0% 
10 8.61 0.76% 
11 8.59 1.53% 
12 8.57 2.37% 
13 8.5 5.21% 
14 8.4 9.71% 
15 8.3 14.34% 
Thus, the number of testing scenarios is 171. In the following sections, the modeled 
relays of chapter 3 are simulated under these scenarios. The steady-state pre-disturbance 
values of Table 6 and Table 7 are shown in Table 8 and Table 9. Detailed testing scenario 
numbers are presented in the Appendix (A). 
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(p.u.) PH-A PH-B PH-C PH-A PH-B PH-C 
8.98 1.052 1.048 1.048 0.413 0.414 0.412 0.379 -0.012 
8.89 1.052 1.048 1.048 0.399 0.403 0.398 0.366 -0.011 
8.78 1.053 1.048 1.048 0.386 0.389 0.385 0.350 -0.012 
8.72 1.053 1.048 1.048 0.378 0.382 0.376 0.343 -0.011 
8.69 1.051 1.047 1.047 0.375 0.378 0.375 0.338 -0.011 
8.66 1.051 1.047 1.047 0.371 0.374 0.369 0.334 -0.011 
8.63 1.051 1.047 1.047 0.367 0.370 0.366 0.330 -0.011 
8.61 1.051 1.047 1.047 0.365 0.368 0.365 0.327 -0.011 
8.59 1.051 1.047 1.047 0.361 0.364 0.360 0.325 -0.011 
8.55 1.051 1.047 1.047 0.357 0.360 0.356 0.319 -0.011 
8.51 1.051 1.047 1.047 0.352 0.354 0.350 0.314 -0.011 
8.42 1.051 1.047 1.047 0.341 0.344 0.340 0.303 -0.011 
8.36 1.050 1.046 1.046 0.336 0.337 0.335 0.295 -0.011 
 




Voltage (p.u.) Current (p.u.) 
Pgen (p.u.) Qgen (p.u.) 
PH-A PH-B PH-C PH-A PH-B PH-C 
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9.2 1.053 1.048 1.049 0.446 0.448 0.445 0.411 -0.012 
9.1 1.053 1.048 1.049 0.429 0.433 0.427 0.396 -0.011 
9 1.053 1.048 1.049 0.416 0.419 0.415 0.382 -0.011 
8.9 1.052 1.047 1.048 0.402 0.404 0.401 0.368 -0.011 
8.8 1.052 1.047 1.048 0.389 0.393 0.387 0.353 -0.011 
8.7 1.052 1.047 1.048 0.376 0.380 0.375 0.340 -0.011 
8.67 1.051 1.047 1.047 0.372 0.374 0.371 0.335 -0.012 
8.65 1.051 1.046 1.047 0.369 0.373 0.368 0.333 -0.011 
8.63 1.051 1.046 1.047 0.367 0.371 0.366 0.330 -0.011 
8.61 1.051 1.046 1.047 0.366 0.368 0.365 0.327 -0.011 
8.59 1.051 1.046 1.047 0.362 0.364 0.360 0.325 -0.011 
8.57 1.051 1.046 1.047 0.359 0.362 0.358 0.322 -0.011 
8.5 1.051 1.046 1.047 0.351 0.354 0.349 0.313 -0.011 
8.4 1.050 1.045 1.046 0.339 0.343 0.337 0.300 -0.011 
8.3 1.050 1.045 1.046 0.327 0.331 0.325 0.288 -0.011 
 
In order to obtain each relay output characteristic (i.e. either 1 or 0) a time interval, called 
maximum islanding detection time, is defined in [16-17]. This time interval is 
approximately 117 ms (7 cycles) for the recloser type B considered in this work. In other 
words, for the following sections, if the calculated time is less than 117 ms, the relay will 
operate, otherwise it will not. 
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4.2 OC Relay 
The OC relay characteristic is of extremely inverse type with TD = 0.1. In order to find 
an appropriate pickup current based on overcurrent formulas expressed in chapter 3 and 
the maximum islanding detection time, pickup currents are varied from 0.278 kAmp to 
0.510 kAmp to give the output results. The outputs versus testing scenario numbers for 
pickups of 0.278 kAmp, 0.370 kAmp, and 0.510 kAmp are shown in Fig. 13, Fig. 14, and 
Fig. 15, respectively. Note that these currents are from the grid side viewpoint not the 
relay. For the relay a current transformer ratio should be considered. As can be seen 
(scenarios 1 to 78 are for islanding and others for non-islanding), by increasing the 
pickup setting, the security will be increase but the dependability will be decrease (or 
NDZ will be increased). Since, the current practice for passive anti-islanding protection 
of DGs is to have minimum NDZ, 0.278 kAmp for pickup current will be chosen. 
 
Fig. 13. OC relay output for 0.278 kAmp 














Fig. 14. OC relay output for 0.370 kAmp 
 
Fig. 15. OC relay output for 0.510 kAmp 
4.3 OV/UV Relay 
The OV/UV Relay has logarithmic characteristic as given in chapter 3 with TD = 0.1 and 
considering maximum islanding detection time. The OV and UV settings are 1.1 p.u. and 
0.9 p.u., respectively. The relay output versus testing scenario numbers are shown in Fig. 
16. 

























Fig. 16. OV/UV relay output 
4.4 OF/UF Relay 
This relays operate according to iterative techniques mentioned previously in chapter 3 to 
estimate the frequency and the pre-specified time for timer is set to 3 cycles. This means 
that if the frequency variations are detected in the first 4 cycles, the disturbance will be 
detected within the maximum islanding detection time (7 cycles). Otherwise, the relay 
will not operate and the disturbance is not detected. The OF/UF relay output versus 
testing scenario numbers are shown in Fig. 17. 
 
Fig. 17. OF/UF relay output 
























4.5 ROCOF Relay 
ROCOF relays work similarly as OF/UF relays since they need to estimate the frequency. 
Fig. 18 shows the relay output for different testing scenario numbers. 
 
Fig. 18. ROCOF relay output 
4.6 Overall conventional scheme output 
The overall passive anti-islanding protection is as the logic diagram of Fig. 19 shows. 
The final output of Fig. 19 is shown in Fig. 20. 
 
Fig. 19. Conventional passive anti-islanding protection scheme 
 
 














Fig. 20. Output of the conventional passive scheme 
4.7 Problems and concerns 
As shown in Fig., the case study system suffers from very low security. This is because, 
there are 73 misclassified events in the non-islanding region with 93 events (i.e. security 
level as low as 32.3%). It should be noted that the relay settings were primarily 
determined to satisfy the minimum NDZ. However, they might have been set in order to 
have maximum security and the problem would be in the low system dependability. 
Either having low security or low dependability will result in low reliability. Thus, the 
solution should cover both cases. Further, the solution should consider both single- and 
three-phase tripping application. Therefore, in the following sections, first a method, data 
mining, is explained which helps develop the desired solution. Then, the proposed 


















Chapter 5  
5 Proposed reliability-enhance passive anti-islanding 
protection scheme 
In this chapter, a comprehensive solution that involves the combination of an Islanding-
Dedicated System (IDS) and the conventional passive anti-islanding protection scheme 
will be proposed for four types of systems. For the case study system, as we explained in 
chapter 5, one of the combinations will be applied to increase the security and hence the 
reliability of the protection scheme. It should be noted that the other three proposed 
schemes may be applicable to other case study system. 
5.1 General structure of the system 
Each relay in the conventional passive protection scheme, in Fig. 19, has a setting value 
that should be adjusted based on a specified sensitivity. The more the sensitivity is 
increased, the less the security and the more the dependability will be, and vice versa. 
Therefore, there is a trade-off between the security and dependability levels. Current 
practice in the field of DG anti-islanding protection is to determine the settings of relays 
based on high dependability levels and having the minimum NDZ possible. However, 
there may also be some situations where a high security is needed while the dependability 
is compromised. 
Therefore, the system reliability, which includes both security and dependability, will 
always be kept lower than a certain level. Therefore, there is a need to design a 
complementary system that combines different passive signals to correctly detect 
islanding and non-islanding events regardless of the relay settings. The four proposed 
logic diagrams of IDS-based scheme are shown in Fig. 33. If the conventional scheme is 
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suffering from low dependability the permissive mode and if suffering from low security 
the blocking mode scheme will be used. 
One of the best ways to design IDS is based on Data Mining. Artificial Neural Networks 
















Fig. 21. General proposed scheme structure: (a) single-phase tripping and permissive 
mode. (b) three-phase tripping and permissive mode. (c) single-phase tripping and 
blocking mode. (d) three-phase tripping and blocking mode. 
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5.2 ANNs and DTCs 
5.2.1 DTCs 
In principle, decision trees are used to predict the membership of objects to different 
categories (classes), taking into account the values that correspond to their attributes 
(patterns). As we have mentioned above, the decision tree method is one of the main data 
mining techniques [41-42].  
Let (X, Y) be jointly distributed random variables with n-dimensional vector X denoting 
a pattern or feature vector and Y denoting the associated class label of X. The 
components of X are the features. The technique can be represented: 
 
a =  {a', a*, … , aH}6                       (22) 
a-  =  {-', -*, … , -B}                      (23) 
e =  {f', f*, … , fH}6                         (24) 
g =  {(ah, fh), i =  1, 2, … , l}        (25) 
Where: 
Xi : ith pattern vector of X 
xi1, xi2, …, xim : independent variables (or features) of the pattern vector Xi 
m : number of independent variables 
y1, y2, …, yn : class (or dependent) variables of the class vector Y 
E : vector of labeled credible events with a total number of N events 
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For this system, let X take values from the set {Rn}, then a decision rule R(X) is a 
function that maps Rn into the values of the class vector Y. Hence, the goal of this 
decision tree is to estimate Y based on observing X. Fig. 22 shows possible binary 
partitions to the two-dimensional system parameter space (X1 and X2) with two classes 
(c1 and c0). The decision boundaries are designated by the solid line with the optimal 
threshold settings of “a” and “b” for X1 and X2, respectively. The decision tree 
corresponding to these decision boundaries is shown in Fig. 23. This figure is 
characterized by: 1) each new threshold defines a split, 2) each split defines two nodes, 
and 3) the last nodes, which define the decision boundaries, are called terminal nodes or 
leaves. 
 




Fig. 23. Decision tree corresponding to decision boundaries in Fig. 22  
In order to determine these optimal threshold settings, the optimal right-sized decision 
tree should be constructed from the data set X. In the concept of decision tree data 
mining, many decision trees can be constructed from a given set of data X. Though some 
of these trees are more accurate than others, finding the optimal tree is practically 
difficult because of large size of search space. However, powerful algorithms have been 
developed [43] to construct decision trees with reasonable accuracy. These algorithms 
use strategy that grows a decision tree by making a series of locally optimum decisions 
about which feature (system parameter) to use for portioning the data set X. The right-
sized (or optimal) decision tree Tk0 is then constructed according to the following 
optimization problem: 
((mhn)  =  1h{o(6p)}                 (26) 




R(Tk) : misclassification error rate of the tree Tk 
Tk0 : optimal decision tree that minimizes the misclassification error R(Tk) 
T : binary tree ∈ {T1, T2, …, t1} 
k : tree index number 
t : node in a tree 
t1 : root node 
T~ : set of nominal nodes of the tree T 
r(t) : re-substitution estimate of the misclassification error of a case in node t 
p(t) : probability that a case falls into node t  
5.2.2 ANNs 
Artificial Neural Networks represent an adaptive information processing systems. We can 
consider ANNs as a massively parallel distributed computing structure. In principle, the 
similarity between ANNs and the way of action of the human brain may be condensed in 
the following two aspects: 
1) Knowledge is acquired by the network through the learning (training) process. 
2) The intensities of the inter-neuron connections, known as (synaptic) weights, 
are used to store acquired knowledge [44]. 
5.2.2.1 Neuron model 




Fig. 24. Neuron model with no bias 
The scalar input p is transmitted through a connection that multiplies its strength by the 
scalar weight w, to form the product wp, again a scalar. Here, the weighted input wp is 
the only argument of the transfer function f, which produces the scalar output a. The 
neuron shown in Fig. 25 has a bias, “b”. You may view the bias as simply being added to 
the product wp as shown by the summing junction or as shifting the function f to the left 
by an amount “b”.  
 
Fig. 25. Neuron model with bias 
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The transfer function net input “n”, again a scalar, is the sum of the weighted input wp 
and the bias “b”. This sum is the argument of the transfer function f. The parameters “w” 
and “b” are both adjustable scalar values of neurons. The central idea of neural networks 
is that such parameters can be adjusted so that the network exhibits some desired or 
interesting behavior. Thus, we can train the network to do a particular job by adjusting 
the weight or bias parameters. 
5.2.2.2 Transfer function 
Three of the most commonly used functions are described in this section, namely hard-
limit transfer function, linear transfer function, and sigmoid transfer functions. 
The hard-limit transfer function, shown in Fig. 26, limits the output of the neuron to 
either “0”, if the net input argument, n, is less than zero, or “1”, if n is greater than or 
equal to zero. 
 
Fig. 26. Hard-limiter unit in ANN 




Fig. 27. Linear transfer function 
The sigmoid transfer functions take the input, which may have a value between plus and 
minus infinity, and squashes the output into the range either 0 to 1, for log-sigmoid in 
shown in Fig. 28, or -1 to 1, for tan-sigmoid shown in Fig. 29. 
 
Fig. 28. Log-sigmoid transfer function 
 
Fig. 29. Tan-sigmoid transfer function 
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5.2.2.3 Neuron with vector input 
A neuron with a single R-element input vector is shown in Fig. 30. Here the individual 
element inputs, p1, … , pR, are multiplied by weights, w1,1, w1,2, …, w1,R and weighted 
values are fed to the summing junction. Their sum is simply Wp, the dot product of the 
matrix W and the vector p. 
 
Fig. 30. Input vector neuron 
Finally, n can be expressed as follows: 
 =  t','' + t',** + ⋯ + t',oo + v           (28) 




Fig. 31. A network with multiple neurons 
A layer includes the combination of the weights, the multiplication and summing 
operation (here realized as a vector product Wp), the bias “b”, and the transfer function f. 
The array of inputs (vector p) is not called a layer. The network with multiple layers is 
shown in Fig. 32. 
 
Fig. 32. Network with multiple layers 
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5.2.2.4 Learning rule and backpropagation  
Learning rule defined as a procedure for modifying the weights and biases of a network 
(also sometimes referred to as training algorithm). The learning rule is applied to train the 
network to perform some particular task.  
In supervised learning, the learning rule is provided with a set of examples (the training 
data set) of proper network behavior: 
{', '} , {*, *} , … , {B, B}           (29) 
Where pi is an input to the network, and ti is the corresponding desired (target) output. 
The learning rule is then used to adjust the weights and biases of the network in order to 
move the network outputs closer to the targets. The perceptron learning rule falls in this 
supervised learning category. 
In order to train highly nonlinear system with complex input-output relations the 
Backpropagation learning technique is introduced. Backpropagation is created by 
generalizing the Widrow-Hoff learning rule to multi-layer networks and nonlinear 
differentiable transfer functions. Networks with biases, a sigmoid layer, and a linear 
output layer are capable of approximating any function with a finite number of 
discontinuities. 
Standard backpropagation is a gradient descent algorithm in which the network weights 
are moved along the negative of the gradient of the performance function. The term 
backpropagation refers to the manner in which the gradient is computed for nonlinear 
multi-layer networks.  
Properly trained backpropagation networks tend to give reasonable answers when 
presented with inputs that they have never seen. Typically, a new input leads to an output 
similar to the correct output for input vectors used in training that are similar to the new 
64 
 
input being presented. This generalization property makes it possible to train a network 
on a representative set of input/target pairs and get good results without training the 
network on all possible input/output pairs. There are, generally, four steps in the training 
process: 1) Assemble the training data 2) Create the network object 3) Train the network 
4) Simulate the network response to new inputs 
5.3 Structure of the IDS 
If the IDSs are designed so that it can detect all the possible “islanding” and “non-
islanding” events, the conventional system will be completely modified. For the rest of 
the thesis, the IDS refers to phase-A IDS unless otherwise stated. 
The IDS needs to have several inputs from the signals measured on the PCC. These 
signals can be in different formats, such as average, RMS value, or by getting samples. 
As will be explained, in this work for several reasons, the input data format is set to be 
samples of the signals instead of average or RMS values. The passive signals which are 
used for passive anti-islanding protection are voltage and current. Frequency is extracted 
from these signals. Rate-Of-Change Of Frequency (ROCOF) is also derived from 
frequency and Rate-Of-Change Of Power (ROCOP) is derived from calculating active 
power from voltage and current signals then differentiating it with respect to time. The 




Fig. 33. Proposed IDS structure based on ANNs 
As is shown in the figure, for each of the derived signals from the PCC, there is a specific 
ANN with its corresponding Hard-limiter. Each ANN is trained in a way that it will 
follow the “islanding” and “non-islanding” patterns associated with its corresponding 
passive signal. Number of inputs to each ANN is 48, considering the sampling rate and 
over 4 power cycles. If the system has a higher sampling rate, it should be first filtered to 
be suited to our 12 sample/cycle system and then fed to the trained ANNs. The outputs of 
ANNs are a number between 0 and 1. As will be shown later, by putting hard-limiters on 
the outputs of ANNs, the small error of training will be decreased to zero. 
Hard-limiter can be characterized as follows: 
f = w0,  < ℎ1,  ≥ ℎ                  (30) 
Where th is the threshold value.  
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The use of multiple ANNs arises from the need for achieving a higher accuracy rate. The 
voting scheme is the simplest method of combining the outputs of multiple networks to 
make the final decision. A decision is made based on which class receives the most votes. 
The confidence of the decision made is represented as an agreement level K defined as 
the ratio of the total number of votes received (either for 1 or 0) to the total number of 
votes. 
In this work, there are five ANNs for each passive signal. Therefore, the voting scheme 
receives five votes and any class (0 or 1) that gets higher number of votes will be the final 
output. Since, there are odd number of votes, there will be no conflict defining the output. 
There are more robust and rigorous scheme of integrating outputs, such as Dempster-
Shafer Theory of Evidence [45], but since there is an operation time limitation, the simple 
voting scheme is used. 
For Phase-B and Phase-C, the IDS structure is the exactly the same as what is explained 
above with the exception that input signals are from their corresponding phases. 
5.4 Training 
After defining the structure of the IDS, the system needs to be trained properly based on 
the distribution system structure in order to successfully detect possible “islanding” and 
“non-islanding” events. 
5.4.1 Training data set 
The choice of the different scenarios for training is very important. They should include 
all the possible worst case disturbances with different DG penetration levels and different 
fault types or manual breaker openings. Further, potential breakers for these scenarios 
should be chosen wisely. 
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The disturbances to be considered are manual breaker opening, single-phase and three-
phase faults at the point of critical breakers. DG Load-Generation Difference (LGD %) 
should also range from a high level (around 20%) to a low level (around 14%) covering 
more percentages near zero (worst case). There is no need to consider percentages 
beyond this range since they will disturb the system enough to be detected by the 
protection system. The operating conditions for these cases are similar to 15 scenarios in 
Table 7. 
Generally, for the training scenarios in the “islanding” region, the breaker locations 
which lead to the lowest change in the load should be considered plus the main breaker. 
In the LDC’s case study distribution system, there are only 3 breakers (locations 1, 2, and 
3) leading to “islanding” events and all are considered. For training in the “non-
islanding” region, in general, the breaker locations with the highest change to the system 
load should be considered. In other words, for two breakers in the same path, the one 
with the highest change to the load should be considered for training. Non-islanding 
breaker locations are 4, 5, and 6 as were shown in Fig. 5. 
There are three different disturbances with fifteen LGDs for each breaker and six 
breakers will lead to 270 scenarios to be considered. All scenarios with their 
corresponding numbers are presented in the Appendix (B). 
Note that for phase-B and phase-C IDSs, the training scenarios are the same as phase-A 
except for single-phase faults that should be single-phase-B and single-phase-C to 
ground, respectively. In the distribution system under study, since the system is basically 
balanced (from the waveforms of voltage and current and steady-state pre-disturbance 
values and Tables 8 and 9), the designed IDS for phase-A can be used for phase-B and 
phase-C without any change. 
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5.4.2 Training process 
Before any explanation about the training process, we need to define the criteria to 
compare the performance of different ANNs when trained. In this work, Mean Absolute 
Error (MAE) is used as a performance index to evaluate both ANNs and ANNs with 
hard-limiters and defined as follows: 
MAE% =  '} ∑ |f- − f9K|}.' × 100                      (31) 
Where i, f-, and f9K are the scenario number, ANN output and target output, respectively. 
There is no definite rule to define the number of hidden layers except through the trial-
and-error process. This is the case for determining the number of neurons for each layer 
and the training function. But, there is an estimate for each of these variables as an initial 
guess. Normally, for the systems of nonlinear input-output relation either one or two 
hidden layers are used in the feed-forward network. Training functions are all in the 
category of Gradient Descent Algorithms with slightly changes. 
Therefore, the optimum characteristics of each of five ANNs are obtained and shown in 
Table 10. We should note that this might not be the most optimum structure that we can 
design since it is obtained through a trial-and-error process, but as will be shown later, it 
is very well satisfying the requirements and the performance needed. The training 
functions mentioned in the Table 10 are briefly explained for interested readers in the 
Appendix (C). 
Table 10: Characteristics of the optimum trained ANNs 
ANN Number of layers 
Number of neurons 
Training Function 
Input Hidden Output 
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Current 4 10 6-4  1 TRAINGDM 
Voltage 3 10 5 1 TRAINR 
Frequency 3 10 5 1 TRAINR 
ROCOF 3 10 5 1 TRAINR 
ROCOP 3 10 4 1 TRAINR 
 
The output of current, voltage, frequency, ROCOF, and ROCOP ANNs with their target 
values are shown in Fig. 35 to Fig. 39. 
 
Fig. 34. Current ANN-based unit output on training scenarios 
























Fig. 35. Voltage ANN-based unit output on training scenarios 
 
Fig. 36. Frequency ANN-based unit output on training scenarios 
 
Fig. 37. ROCOF ANN-based unit output on training scenarios 


































































Fig. 38. ROCOP ANN-based unit output on training scenarios 
As stated before, the aim of putting a hard-limiter at the output of ANN is to make the 
output completely follow the target value. In other words, the overall MAE of each ANN 
should be zero before entering the voting scheme. However, first, we need to find a 
proper value for the threshold, th, of each ANN.  
The threshold can be a value between the minimum (value A) of the “islanding” and the 
maximum (value B) of the “non-islanding” region. For this work, we used the average of 
the maximum and minimum as threshold to have an equal distance between these three 
points and thus compensate for unpredicted errors both in the “islanding” and “non-
islanding” regions. Maximum, minimum, and the average value of each ANN are shown 
in Table 11. The MAEs with and without a hard-limiter are also shown in Table 12. 
Table 11: Values of A, B, and average of A and B for different ANNs on training 
scenarios 
ANN Value A Value B Average 
Current 0.78 0.05 0.415 
Voltage 0.9 0.11 0.505 
Frequency 0.78 0.07 0.425 























ROCOF 0.91 0.14 0.525 
ROCOP 0.92 0.088 0.504 
 
Table 12: MAEs for ANNs with and without hard-limiter on training scenarios 
ANN Without hard-limiter With hard-limiter 
current 1.3731 0 
voltage 1.0758 0 
frequency 1.2914 0 
ROCOF 1.1100 0 
ROCOP 1.6594 0 
 
5.5 Testing 
The testing scenarios were fully explained in chapter 5. In this section, the complete IDS 
with its fully trained five ANNs and threshold settings of hard-limiters are tested on the 
testing data set. The threshold values for each hard-limiter are set as the average values 
obtained in Table 11. The five ANN outputs, target values, and threshold values are 




Fig. 39. Current ANN-based unit output on testing scenarios 
 
Fig. 40. Voltage ANN-based unit output on testing scenarios 
 
Fig. 41. Frequency ANN-based unit output on testing scenarios 





































































Fig. 42. ROCOF ANN-based unit output on testing scenarios 
 
Fig. 43. ROCOP ANN-based unit output on testing scenarios 
As can be seen from the Fig. 40 to Fig. 44, the threshold values for all five hard-limiters 
are placed between the values A and B. These values are also obtained in Table 13. 
Table 13: Values A, B, and average of A and B for ANNs on testing scenarios 
ANN Value A Value B Average Threshold 
Current 0.79 0.05 0.42 0.415 
Voltage 0.97 0.13 0.55 0.505 













































Frequency 0.96 0.03 0.495 0.425 
ROCOF 0.94 0.10 0.52 0.525 
ROCOP 0.94 0.07 0.505 0.504 
 
The results show that the averaging technique to define the threshold value is best suited 
for ROCOP, ROCOF, and current ANNs as the average and threshold values are very 
close. Although for voltage and frequency ANNs the difference is higher than other 
ANNs, still they are well satisfying the aim of using hard-limiters. Table 14 shows the 
MAE of the five ANNs with and without hard-limiter. 
Table 14: MAEs for ANNs with and without hard-limiter on testing scenarios 
ANN Without hard-limiter With hard-limiter 
current 1.4410 0 
voltage 1.0429 0 
frequency 0.5970 0 
ROCOF 1.0561 0 
ROCOP 1.9447 0 
 
5.6 Proposed scheme final output on testing scenarios 
Since we are dealing with a system with low security in our case study and it is used for 
three-phase tripping applications, the proposed scheme is blocking mode as in Fig. 33 (d). 
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The final output of the proposed passive anti-islanding protection scheme under the 
testing data set is shown in Fig. 45. 
 
Fig. 44. Proposed scheme final output under testing scenarios 
 













Chapter 6  
6 Summary 
6.1 Contributions 
The proposed IDS for islanding detection has several advantages and contributions with 
respect to previous intelligent-based islanding detection techniques [41-42] as follows: 
6.1.1 Accuracy 
The IDS gets inputs as samples instead of single values (average or RMS) and the 
number of inputs for each ANN becomes 48. Using single values as the input of IDS can 
cause problems, in some cases, regarding the accuracy of the method. This will be 
explained with the following two examples. 
Fig. 46 shows two current waveforms, one for scenario#4 and another for scenario#186 
(of training data set). As is presented in the Appendix (B), scenario#4 is for an islanding 
and scenario#186 belongs to a non-islanding event. However, both have the same RMS 
value equal to 0.92 kAmp. Therefore, if RMS value was used, the IDS would have 
confusing training patterns and the accuracy level of the proposed IDS would be 
decreased. There are also several other cases having the same problem of RMS values. 
 
Fig. 45. Current waveforms of two opposite scenarios with equal RMS values 





















Another example showing the average value is shown in Fig. 47. The active powers of 
two different scenarios (#3 and #142) are shown, the former as islanding and the latter as 
non-islanding. Both waveforms have their average active power equal to 3.36 MW. This 
will again cause the same problem for the training algorithm as viewed from the IDS. 
By averaging or taking RMS of the signal, some features of the signal which are 
important to the islanding detection system are lost. Therefore, another way of inputting 
the data is suggested in this work. The samples of data will be as IDS input. 
 
Fig. 46. Active power waveforms of two opposite scenarios with equal average 
values 
Let us consider Fig. 46 or Fig. 47. If we get 48 uniformly-spaced samples from the 
waveforms, there will be a clear distinction between the two waveforms and will not 
cause any training problems for the IDS. Therefore, the IDS will be trained using clear 
and differentiable training data set in an appropriate format that will lead to the most 
accurately designed IDS having no cases misclassified.   
6.1.2 Speed 
Another advantage of changing the input data format of the IDS is the ability to reduce 
the sampling period while maintaining the same level of accuracy. Previously, the eight-























cycle sampling period was used in similar works to design the intelligent-based islanding 
detection system [41-42]. In this work, the sampling period is set to four cycles with the 
sampling rate of 12 samples/cycle with all the training and testing cases classified 
correctly. Therefore, four cycles are saved for other possible operations within the relay. 
An operating speed test was also performed on a 1 GHz Intel processor in the MATLAB 
environment using TIC TOC command. The results of five ANNs are obtained in Table 
15. Note that the operating times are the average values of 171 operating times of testing 
scenarios. 
Table 15: Operating times of ANNs on a 1 GHz Intel platform 
Classification Module time (ms) time (#cycles) 
Current 13.5 0.81 
Voltage 11.9 0.71 
Frequency 11.9 0.71 
ROCOF 11.9 0.71 
ROCOP 12 0.72 
 
6.2 Conclusion 
In this thesis, a reliability-enhanced passive anti-islanding protection scheme was 
proposed. The technique was based on the fact that in the conventional passive anti-
islanding schemes, which consist of several relays, the relay settings cannot be set such 
that the security and dependability be optimized at the same time. Therefore, there is 
always a loss of security or dependability in the system, depending on the relay settings 
optimization goal. An Islanding-Dedicated System (IDS) was thus introduced to be 
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combined with conventional scheme to enhance either security (in a blocking mode) or 
dependability (in a permissive mode). For each phase a specific IDS was designed which 
made it applicable to single-phase tripping applications. Data mining techniques were the 
best suited ways to design and train the proposed phase IDSs. From the various data 
mining techniques, artificial neural networks were chosen due to some advantages of 
accuracy and speed.  
The proposed scheme was tested and verified on a practical LDC’s radial distribution 
system with six DFIG-DG wind turbines. The studied system was in three-phase tripping 
and low security category. Therefore, the appropriate phase IDS implementation was 
chosen and the IDSs were designed based on this assumption. The results indicated that 
the proposed IDS-based technique can effectively be used to enhance the reliability of the 
conventional passive anti-islanding protection schemes either by increasing security or 
dependability. 
6.3 Future works 
We have used only one location for DFIG-DGs in the distribution system (i.e. one PCC) 
in the case study system. There is a very good potential to extend this work to distribution 
systems with multiple PCCs with different types of DGs, such as PV or SEIG-DG, and 
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Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
1 8.98 -12.57% 
2 8.89 -9.47% 
3 8.78 -5.57% 
4 8.72 -3.51% 
5 8.69 -2.29% 
6 8.66 -1.13% 
7 8.63 0% 
8 8.61 0.95% 
9 8.59 1.69% 
10 8.55 3.40% 
11 8.51 5.14% 
12 8.42 8.95% 
13 8.36 11.77% 
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Appendix A: Testing Scenarios 
 
BREAKER#1 3-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
14 8.98 -12.57% 
15 8.89 -9.47% 
16 8.78 -5.57% 
17 8.72 -3.51% 
18 8.69 -2.29% 
19 8.66 -1.13% 
20 8.63 0% 
21 8.61 0.95% 
22 8.59 1.69% 
23 8.55 3.40% 
24 8.51 5.14% 
25 8.42 8.95% 
























BREAKER#1 1-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
27 8.98 -12.57% 
28 8.89 -9.47% 
29 8.78 -5.57% 
30 8.72 -3.51% 
31 8.69 -2.29% 
32 8.66 -1.13% 
33 8.63 0% 
34 8.61 0.95% 
35 8.59 1.69% 
36 8.55 3.40% 
37 8.51 5.14% 
38 8.42 8.95% 
39 8.36 11.77% 
 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
14 8.98 -12.57% 
15 8.89 -9.47% 
BREAKER#2 OPENING 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
40 8.98 -12.57% 
41 8.89 -9.47% 
42 8.78 -5.57% 
43 8.72 -3.51% 
44 8.69 -2.29% 
45 8.66 -1.13% 
46 8.63 0% 
47 8.61 0.95% 
48 8.59 1.69% 
49 8.55 3.40% 
50 8.51 5.14% 
51 8.42 8.95% 
























BREAKER#2 3-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
53 8.98 -12.57% 
54 8.89 -9.47% 
55 8.78 -5.57% 
56 8.72 -3.51% 
57 8.69 -2.29% 
58 8.66 -1.13% 
59 8.63 0% 
60 8.61 0.95% 
61 8.59 1.69% 
62 8.55 3.40% 
63 8.51 5.14% 
64 8.42 8.95% 
65 8.36 11.77% 
 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
14 8.98 -12.57% 
15 8.89 -9.47% 
BREAKER#2 1-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
66 8.98 -12.57% 
67 8.89 -9.47% 
68 8.78 -5.57% 
69 8.72 -3.51% 
70 8.69 -2.29% 
71 8.66 -1.13% 
72 8.63 0% 
73 8.61 0.95% 
74 8.59 1.69% 
75 8.55 3.40% 
76 8.51 5.14% 
77 8.42 8.95% 

























Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
79 8.98 -12.57% 
80 8.89 -9.47% 
81 8.78 -5.57% 
82 8.72 -3.51% 
83 8.69 -2.29% 
84 8.66 -1.13% 
85 8.63 0% 
86 8.61 0.95% 
87 8.59 1.69% 
88 8.55 3.40% 
89 8.51 5.14% 
90 8.42 8.95% 
91 8.36 11.77% 
 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
14 8.98 -12.57% 
15 8.89 -9.47% 
BREAKER#4 3-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
92 8.98 -12.57% 
93 8.89 -9.47% 
94 8.78 -5.57% 
95 8.72 -3.51% 
96 8.69 -2.29% 
97 8.66 -1.13% 
98 8.63 0% 
99 8.61 0.95% 
100 8.59 1.69% 
101 8.55 3.40% 
102 8.51 5.14% 
103 8.42 8.95% 
























BREAKER#4 1-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
105 8.98 -12.57% 
106 8.89 -9.47% 
107 8.78 -5.57% 
108 8.72 -3.51% 
109 8.69 -2.29% 
110 8.66 -1.13% 
111 8.63 0% 
112 8.61 0.95% 
113 8.59 1.69% 
114 8.55 3.40% 
115 8.51 5.14% 
116 8.42 8.95% 
117 8.36 11.77% 
 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
14 8.98 -12.57% 
15 8.89 -9.47% 
BREAKER#6 OPENING 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
118 8.98 -12.57% 
119 8.89 -9.47% 
120 8.78 -5.57% 
121 8.72 -3.51% 
122 8.69 -2.29% 
123 8.66 -1.13% 
124 8.63 0% 
125 8.61 0.95% 
126 8.59 1.69% 
127 8.55 3.40% 
128 8.51 5.14% 
129 8.42 8.95% 
























BREAKER#6 3-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
131 8.98 -12.57% 
132 8.89 -9.47% 
133 8.78 -5.57% 
134 8.72 -3.51% 
135 8.69 -2.29% 
136 8.66 -1.13% 
137 8.63 0% 
138 8.61 0.95% 
139 8.59 1.69% 
140 8.55 3.40% 
141 8.51 5.14% 
142 8.42 8.95% 
143 8.36 11.77% 
 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
14 8.98 -12.57% 
15 8.89 -9.47% 
BREAKER#6 1-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
144 8.98 -12.57% 
145 8.89 -9.47% 
146 8.78 -5.57% 
147 8.72 -3.51% 
148 8.69 -2.29% 
149 8.66 -1.13% 
150 8.63 0% 
151 8.61 0.95% 
152 8.59 1.69% 
153 8.55 3.40% 
154 8.51 5.14% 
155 8.42 8.95% 




SUDDEN WIND SPEED CHANGE (1 M/S) 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
157 9.2 -19.41% 
158 9.1 -16.40% 
159 9 -13.36% 
160 8.9 -10.06% 
161 8.8 -6.50% 
162 8.7 -2.78% 
163 8.67 -1.58% 
164 8.65 -0.84% 
165 8.63 0% 
166 8.61 0.76% 
167 8.59 1.53% 
168 8.57 2.37% 
169 8.5 5.21% 
170 8.4 9.71% 
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BREAKER#1 OPENING 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
1 9.2 -19.41% 
2 9.1 -16.40% 
3 9 -13.36% 
4 8.9 -10.06% 
5 8.8 -6.50% 
6 8.7 -2.78% 
7 8.67 -1.58% 
8 8.65 -0.84% 
9 8.63 0% 
10 8.61 0.76% 
11 8.59 1.53% 
12 8.57 2.37% 
13 8.5 5.21% 
14 8.4 9.71% 
15 8.3 14.34% 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
BREAKER#1 3-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
16 9.2 -19.41% 
17 9.1 -16.40% 
18 9 -13.36% 
19 8.9 -10.06% 
20 8.8 -6.50% 
21 8.7 -2.78% 
22 8.67 -1.58% 
23 8.65 -0.84% 
24 8.63 0% 
25 8.61 0.76% 
26 8.59 1.53% 
27 8.57 2.37% 
28 8.5 5.21% 
29 8.4 9.71% 























BREAKER#1 1-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
31 9.2 -19.41% 
32 9.1 -16.40% 
33 9 -13.36% 
34 8.9 -10.06% 
35 8.8 -6.50% 
36 8.7 -2.78% 
37 8.67 -1.58% 
38 8.65 -0.84% 
39 8.63 0% 
40 8.61 0.76% 
41 8.59 1.53% 
42 8.57 2.37% 
43 8.5 5.21% 
44 8.4 9.71% 
45 8.3 14.34% 
 
BREAKER#2 OPENING 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
46 9.2 -19.41% 
47 9.1 -16.40% 
48 9 -13.36% 
49 8.9 -10.06% 
50 8.8 -6.50% 
51 8.7 -2.78% 
52 8.67 -1.58% 
53 8.65 -0.84% 
54 8.63 0% 
55 8.61 0.76% 
56 8.59 1.53% 
57 8.57 2.37% 
58 8.5 5.21% 
59 8.4 9.71% 























BREAKER#2 3-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
61 9.2 -19.41% 
62 9.1 -16.40% 
63 9 -13.36% 
64 8.9 -10.06% 
65 8.8 -6.50% 
66 8.7 -2.78% 
67 8.67 -1.58% 
68 8.65 -0.84% 
69 8.63 0% 
70 8.61 0.76% 
71 8.59 1.53% 
72 8.57 2.37% 
73 8.5 5.21% 
74 8.4 9.71% 
75 8.3 14.34% 
 
BREAKER#2 1-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
76 9.2 -19.41% 
77 9.1 -16.40% 
78 9 -13.36% 
79 8.9 -10.06% 
80 8.8 -6.50% 
81 8.7 -2.78% 
82 8.67 -1.58% 
83 8.65 -0.84% 
84 8.63 0% 
85 8.61 0.76% 
86 8.59 1.53% 
87 8.57 2.37% 
88 8.5 5.21% 
89 8.4 9.71% 
























Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
91 9.2 -19.41% 
92 9.1 -16.40% 
93 9 -13.36% 
94 8.9 -10.06% 
95 8.8 -6.50% 
96 8.7 -2.78% 
97 8.67 -1.58% 
98 8.65 -0.84% 
99 8.63 0% 
100 8.61 0.76% 
101 8.59 1.53% 
102 8.57 2.37% 
103 8.5 5.21% 
104 8.4 9.71% 
105 8.3 14.34% 
 
BREAKER#3 3-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
106 9.2 -19.41% 
107 9.1 -16.40% 
108 9 -13.36% 
109 8.9 -10.06% 
110 8.8 -6.50% 
111 8.7 -2.78% 
112 8.67 -1.58% 
113 8.65 -0.84% 
114 8.63 0% 
115 8.61 0.76% 
116 8.59 1.53% 
117 8.57 2.37% 
118 8.5 5.21% 
119 8.4 9.71% 























BREAKER#3 1-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
121 9.2 -19.41% 
122 9.1 -16.40% 
123 9 -13.36% 
124 8.9 -10.06% 
125 8.8 -6.50% 
126 8.7 -2.78% 
127 8.67 -1.58% 
128 8.65 -0.84% 
129 8.63 0% 
130 8.61 0.76% 
131 8.59 1.53% 
132 8.57 2.37% 
133 8.5 5.21% 
134 8.4 9.71% 
135 8.3 14.34% 
 
BREAKER#4 OPENING 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
136 9.2 -19.41% 
137 9.1 -16.40% 
138 9 -13.36% 
139 8.9 -10.06% 
140 8.8 -6.50% 
141 8.7 -2.78% 
142 8.67 -1.58% 
143 8.65 -0.84% 
144 8.63 0% 
145 8.61 0.76% 
146 8.59 1.53% 
147 8.57 2.37% 
148 8.5 5.21% 
149 8.4 9.71% 























BREAKER#4 3-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
151 9.2 -19.41% 
152 9.1 -16.40% 
153 9 -13.36% 
154 8.9 -10.06% 
155 8.8 -6.50% 
156 8.7 -2.78% 
157 8.67 -1.58% 
158 8.65 -0.84% 
159 8.63 0% 
160 8.61 0.76% 
161 8.59 1.53% 
162 8.57 2.37% 
163 8.5 5.21% 
164 8.4 9.71% 
165 8.3 14.34% 
 
BREAKER#4 1-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
166 9.2 -19.41% 
167 9.1 -16.40% 
168 9 -13.36% 
169 8.9 -10.06% 
170 8.8 -6.50% 
171 8.7 -2.78% 
172 8.67 -1.58% 
173 8.65 -0.84% 
174 8.63 0% 
175 8.61 0.76% 
176 8.59 1.53% 
177 8.57 2.37% 
178 8.5 5.21% 
179 8.4 9.71% 
























Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
181 9.2 -19.41% 
182 9.1 -16.40% 
183 9 -13.36% 
184 8.9 -10.06% 
185 8.8 -6.50% 
186 8.7 -2.78% 
187 8.67 -1.58% 
188 8.65 -0.84% 
189 8.63 0% 
190 8.61 0.76% 
191 8.59 1.53% 
192 8.57 2.37% 
193 8.5 5.21% 
194 8.4 9.71% 
195 8.3 14.34% 
 
BREAKER#5 3-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
196 9.2 -19.41% 
197 9.1 -16.40% 
198 9 -13.36% 
199 8.9 -10.06% 
200 8.8 -6.50% 
201 8.7 -2.78% 
202 8.67 -1.58% 
203 8.65 -0.84% 
204 8.63 0% 
205 8.61 0.76% 
206 8.59 1.53% 
207 8.57 2.37% 
208 8.5 5.21% 
209 8.4 9.71% 























BREAKER#5 1-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
211 9.2 -19.41% 
212 9.1 -16.40% 
213 9 -13.36% 
214 8.9 -10.06% 
215 8.8 -6.50% 
216 8.7 -2.78% 
217 8.67 -1.58% 
218 8.65 -0.84% 
219 8.63 0% 
220 8.61 0.76% 
221 8.59 1.53% 
222 8.57 2.37% 
223 8.5 5.21% 
224 8.4 9.71% 
225 8.3 14.34% 
 
BREAKER#6 OPENING 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
226 9.2 -19.41% 
227 9.1 -16.40% 
228 9 -13.36% 
229 8.9 -10.06% 
230 8.8 -6.50% 
231 8.7 -2.78% 
232 8.67 -1.58% 
233 8.65 -0.84% 
234 8.63 0% 
235 8.61 0.76% 
236 8.59 1.53% 
237 8.57 2.37% 
238 8.5 5.21% 
239 8.4 9.71% 
























BREAKER#6 3-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
241 9.2 -19.41% 
242 9.1 -16.40% 
243 9 -13.36% 
244 8.9 -10.06% 
245 8.8 -6.50% 
246 8.7 -2.78% 
247 8.67 -1.58% 
248 8.65 -0.84% 
249 8.63 0% 
250 8.61 0.76% 
251 8.59 1.53% 
252 8.57 2.37% 
253 8.5 5.21% 
254 8.4 9.71% 
255 8.3 14.34% 
 
BREAKER#6 1-PH FAULT 
Number Wind Speed (m/s) LGD % 
256 9.2 -19.41% 
257 9.1 -16.40% 
258 9 -13.36% 
259 8.9 -10.06% 
260 8.8 -6.50% 
261 8.7 -2.78% 
262 8.67 -1.58% 
263 8.65 -0.84% 
264 8.63 0% 
265 8.61 0.76% 
266 8.59 1.53% 
267 8.57 2.37% 
268 8.5 5.21% 
269 8.4 9.71% 
270 8.3 14.34% 
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Appendix C: MATLAB Training Functions 
The most commonly used training functions for the nonlinear feed-forward neural 
networks are the Gradient Descent Algorithms or Backpropagation Algorithms. In the 
basic backpropagation algorithm the weights are moved in the direction of the negative 
gradient. 
There are many variations to the basic backpropagation algorithms for faster and more 
efficient convergence. In this section, the two training functions are briefly explained. 
One of them is the Gradient Descent with Momentum (TRAINGDM). Momentum allows 
a network to respond not only to the local gradient, but also to recent trends in the error 
surface. Acting like a low-pass filter, momentum allows the network to ignore small 
features in the error surface. Without a momentum, a network may get stuck in a shallow 
local minimum. 
Another variation of the backpropagation algorithm is called Random Order Weight/Bias 
Learning Rule (TRAINR). TRAINR trains a network with weight and bias learning rules 













Phasor Estimation Units (PMUs), Wide-Area Monitoring and Synchronization, Synchrophasors, 
Smart Grid, Distributed Generation Modeling and Control.   
Education 
• The University of Western Ontario (UWO), London, Canada (Sep. 2010 - Present) 
 Master of Science: Power Electrical Engineering 
 Specialization: Power Systems Protection and Control 
• Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran (Sep. 2006 – Sep. 2010) 
 Bachelor of Science: Electrical Engineering 
Publications 
 M. Sheikholeslamzadeh, T. S. Sidhu, “Reliability-Enhanced Passive Anti-
Islanding Protection Scheme for a Radial Distribution System with Distributed 
Generation", to be submitted to IEEE Trans. on Power Delivery. 
 M. Sheikholeslamzadeh, T. S. Sidhu, “Modeling, Analysis, and Improvement of 
Anti-Islanding Relays for a Radial Distribution System Embedding DFIG-DG 
Wind Turbines”, IEEE CCECE 2012 Conference in Montreal (accepted for oral 
presentation). 
 M. Sheikholeslamzadeh, H. Bitaraf, A. Ghaedi, M. Khaleghi,“The Study of 
Resonance Phenomenon Due to Capacitor Banks and Its Effect on Electric 
Utility Using Harmonic Analysis”, EPDC Conference 2010, Tehran, Iran. 
 M. Sheikholeslamzadeh, H. Bitaraf, A. Ghaedi, M. Khaleghi, “Methods of 
Evaluation and Analysis of Choosing Distribution Transformers Based on 
Economic Losses”, EPDC Conference 2010, Tehran, Iran. 
Projects 
 “Fast Breaker Failure Scheme”: Course project for Computer-Based Relaying 
course, fall 2011. 
 “Protection of Distributed Generators – Both Normal and Micro-Grid Mode”, 
Course project for Theory and Application of Protective Relays, winter 2011. 
 “IEC 61850 Fundamentals and a Brief Literature Review”, Project for Theory 
and Application of Protective Relays, winter 2011. 
 “Structures of Passive Islanding-Specific Relays in Distributed Generators: 
ROCOF, OV/UV, OF/UF and VShift”, A part of Master’s Thesis, winter 2011. 
 “Design and Analysis of a robust Vector Control Scheme for DFIG Doubly-Fed 
Induction Generator) and PMSG (Permanent Magnet Synchronous Generator) 
103 
 
Torque Control”, Course project for Vector Control of Rotating Machines, winter 
2011. 
 “Design of a fast-computing Wind Turbine Model for Power System 
Simulations”, Course project for Vector Control of Rotating Machines, winter 
2011. 
 “Design of a novel Full ZCS (Zero Current Switching) Full Bridge High 
Frequency PWM Converter”, Course project for High Frequency DC-DC 
Converters, fall 2010. 
Honors 
 Recipient of Western Graduate Engineering Scholarship. 
 3rd rank among undergraduate students of Power Electrical Engineering in 2010. 
 Ranked 52 among over 300,000 students in the national universities entrance 
exam in 2006 in Iran known as Konkoor and was admitted to school of Electrical 
Engineering of Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran. 
 Recipient of the Best Paper Presentation in EPDC Conference 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
